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Revolutions in the head: Darwin, Malthus and Robert M. Young 
Abstract 
The late 1960s witnessed a key conjunction between political activism and the history of 
science. Science, whether seen as a touchstone of rationality or of oppression, was 
fundamental to all sides in the era of the Vietnam War. This essay examines the historian 
Robert Maxwell Young’s turn to Marxism and radical politics during this period, especially 
his widely cited account of the ‘common context’ of nineteenth-century biological and social 
theorizing, which demonstrated the centrality of Thomas Malthus’s writings on population 
for Charles Darwin’s formulation of the theory of evolution by natural selection. From 
Young’s perspective, this history was bound up with pressing contemporary issues: 
ideologies of class and race in neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, the revival of Malthusian 
population control, and the role of science in military conflict. The aim was to provide a basis 
for political action—the ‘head revolution’ that would accompany radical social change. The 
radical force of Young’s argument was blunted in subsequent decades by disciplinary 
developments within history of science, including the emergence of specialist Darwin studies, 
a focus on practice, and the changing political associations of the history of ideas. Young’s 
engaged standpoint, however, has remained influential even as historians moved from 
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Anyone who thinks history and long arguments are mystifying can stop reading after 
two sentences from Jerry Rubin: “the New Left sprang, a predestined pissed-off child, 
from Elvis’ gyrating pelvis. ... there can be no social revolution without a head 
revolution and no head revolution without a social revolution.” 
     —Bob Young, ‘The new nation?’, Bath Festival of Blues & Progressive Music 
(1970), p. 29. 
What does historical writing have to do with political action? This essay highlights a moment 
when the history of science became part of the struggle for radical social transformation. In 
the late 1960s, intellectual history was the field on which battles about the meaning of science 
were fought. For many commentators, the values of post-Galilean science were the natural 
ally of enlightened liberalism. For radical socialists of the New Left, however, natural science 
either provided the justification for scientific socialism, or alternatively had an ambiguous 
legacy as the source of environmental disaster, racial prejudice and military domination. As 
Theodore Roszak wrote in The Making of a Counter Culture (1969), ‘Reason, material 
Progress, the scientific world view have revealed themselves in numerous respects as simply 
a higher superstition, based on dubious but well-concealed assumptions about man and 
nature.’ Intellectual foundations really mattered.1 
The early writings of Robert M. Young and their fate in subsequent decades offer a 
revealing window on the changing politics of history of science. Born in Texas in 1935, 
Young studied philosophy and religion at Yale, and did a Ph.D. on history of psychology at 
Cambridge, where he taught history of science for a decade from 1964 before leaving for 
London to engage in radical politics, publishing and eventually psychoanalytic practice. Like 
Jerry Ravetz, Gary Werskey and others in the radical science movement, Young brought 
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American perspectives to bear on longstanding British controversies about the role of science 
in society.2 His lifetime goal was to understand human nature in the broadest sense.3  
My focus is on Young’s essays on the nineteenth-century disputes over the place of 
humans in nature, and particularly his most audacious claim, that the central theory of 
modern biological science originated as an answer to questions about politics, religion and 
economics. His celebrated article, ‘Malthus and the evolutionists: the common context of 
biological and social theory’, argued that Charles Darwin formulated the theory of evolution 
by natural selection as part of wide-ranging discussions of human nature and natural 
theology—particularly the controversy about Thomas Robert Malthus’s An Essay on the 
Principle of Population (6th ed, 1826).4 For many, especially biologists, this was anathema. 
Young’s article, presented in 1968 and published in Past and Present in the following year, 
has long been taught and cited throughout the English-speaking world, but in ways that fail to 
recognize its iconoclastic aims. Its history illustrates not only the political functions of 
academic writing at a moment of dramatic upheaval, but also the ways in which the politics 
of understanding past science has changed since. 
 
Storming the citadel 
From the distance of fifty years, we can see Young’s concern with Darwin, Malthus and the 
Victorian debate about ‘man’s place in nature’ as the product of a specific historical juncture. 
The critical context was the Vietnam war. Notably, Young was one of the signatories of 
‘Bombing of North Vietnam’, a letter to The Times in May 1966 from twenty-one Cambridge 
academics against the conflict, organized by the classicist Moses Finley. 5 For many, the 
war—with its use of napalm, Agent Orange and other science-based weapons—revealed the 
profound involvement of the sciences in what President Dwight D. Eisenhower had termed 
the ‘military-industrial complex’. Science, shown by the war to be complicit in social 
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injustice and imperial domination, could not claim to be neutral and value-free. From this 
perspective, enquiring into the political origins of natural selection not only posed an 
interesting historical question; it stormed the scientific citadel.  
From this perspective, the kind of history of science that Young had been advocating 
since 1964 from his position as a lecturer at Cambridge could serve as a force for resistance 
and liberation. The extent of his radical conversion cannot be overestimated. Born into a 
relatively impoverished family in Highland Park, the wealthiest Dallas suburb, Young had 
served in the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), and until the age of twenty had shared 
his parent’s fundamentalist religious views. He brought to the countercultural cause all the 
evangelical fervour of a Texan abroad. With motorcycle, big boots, strong libido and an 
abrasive unwillingness to conform, Young presented himself as an incorruptible maverick in 
a hidebound world of sherry and college dinners. From 1968 he retooled his approach to the 
problem of human nature through an increasingly uncompromising turn to Marxism and 
radical politics. The central concern always remained the difficult task of reconciling 
intellectual enquiry and social action.6 
The tension between thought and action as political forms is clear in ‘The new 
nation?’, an essay written by Young for the programme of the Bath Festival of Blues and 
Progressive Music in June 1970. This was a major event held in the wake of Woodstock, with 
an audience estimated at 150,000 and featuring bands from the Byrds and Jefferson Airplane 
to Pink Floyd and Led Zeppelin; it later became the inspiration for the annual gathering at 
Glastonbury. Young had already discussed ‘The pop scene’ on BBC radio and so was 
emerging as a noted commentator on contemporary music and social transformation. The 
essay, retitled as ‘Functions of rock’, appeared again in December as the lead article in a 
special issue of the New Edinburgh Review on ‘The underground’ (Fig. 1). For this version, 





Fig. 1. New Edinburgh Review (Dec. 1970), no. 10, cover of special issue on ‘The 
underground’, with Young’s essay on ‘Functions of rock’ as the lead article. The magazine, 
run by students at the University of Edinburgh, appeared every two months. Author’s 
collection, reprinted by permission of Polygon, Birkitt Ltd. 
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What, Young asked, was the relation between the ‘head revolution’ represented by 
rock and progressive music, and real-life social and political revolution? What did it mean 
when the Jefferson Airplane’s recently released ‘Volunteers’ advocated revolution in the 
streets, or when Bob Dylan sang ‘You don’t need a weatherman to know which way the wind 
blows’?  
This raises the question I have been posing in different forms throughout this article. 
How much has the music really freed people from oppression and repression, and how 
much is it a subtle accommodation with them? Gospel and blues, country & western, 
even folk and protest were consolations. They gave strength, they even helped to 
produce some changes in the real world, but they always led, in the end, away from 
total commitment to the kinds of integrated social and political and personal changes 
that people dream of when they invoke the word ‘Revolution’. I don’t know the 
elements of the structural critique that is required to achieve these changes, nor can I 
specify the role of rock and festivals in it. But I do know that we should be aware of 
an alternative interpretation of the function of rock and festivals, an interpretation 
which shows that we may very well be diverting our energies from achieving and 
implementing that critique. I’m not suggesting that we must choose between the 
music and the festivals on the one hand and hard-headed politics on the other. If we 
lose the spirit of the music, we lose the political and social and personal integration as 
well. But if we think the head revolution is enough on its own, we are leading 
ourselves into the same blind alley that earlier manifestations of the music have 
done.7 
Just at this time Young was engaged in more direct forms of political action. He and his 
second wife Sheila Ernst became involved in the international campaign on behalf of Rudi 
Dutschke, a German student at Clare Hall who was deported from Britain by the Heath 
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government as a danger to the state. While visiting Dutschke in Denmark in 1971, Bob and 
Sheila decided to form a commune in their house at 27 High Street in Chesterton, Cambridge, 
which embodied their aspiration towards revolutionary transformation.8 
The rapidly changing situation led to unusual conjunctions. At the same time as 
Young had been campaigning for Dutschke, his article on ‘The impact of Darwin on 
conventional thought’ appeared in a collection of lectures published by no less staid an 
institution than the Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge, This essay was based 
on a talk he had given at the National Portrait Gallery in the winter of 1968.9 For Young, 
participating in these diverse settings was part of a single process. ‘History and long 
arguments’ were not mystifications, but were essential to the movement’s success. Just as 
music and social change could go hand in hand, carefully researched historical analysis could 
underpin efforts to change science, as part of the broader campaign for social justice. The key 
element was action. Young concluded the ‘Afterthoughts’ added to the New Edinburgh 
Review by noting that ‘strategy and tactics must be appropriate to the objective conditions in 
Britain, and there is no substitute for political action, however much we should leaven them 
by the soul and values of rock music.’10 In terms of tactics, history of science was relevant, in 
an even broader way, in revealing the conceptual foundations for appropriate action. But 
history was useful only if it led to action. 
What mattered for the committed historian of science was the history of ideas. This 
may come as a surprise to many who assume that intellectual history was the exclusive 
preserve of anti-Marxist defenders of the West during the Cold War.11 Yet all sides in the 
debate saw the foundations of science as conceptual. The dominance of this view was partly a 
response to the perceived crudity of ‘vulgar’ Marxism, in which the scientific superstructure 
grew directly out of the economic and technological base. That approach was usually typified 
by ‘The social and economic roots of Newton’s Principia’, a paper by Boris Hessen from the 
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Russian delegation at the famous International Congress of the History of Science and 
Technology in July 1931. Hessen’s argument, although far from following a party line (he 
was executed in 1936), came to symbolize the failures of the Soviet Union under Stalin.12 
Instead Young looked to the early Marx and writers such as György Lukács and Herbert 
Marcuse, who were at this time widely influential in the academic New Left.  
Intellectual history was the chosen medium not only for the leading voices of liberal 
historiography (including Charles Gillispie and Thomas Kuhn in the United States, and 
Rupert Hall and Alistair Crombie in Britain) but equally for those who looked to see the 
establishment overthrown. The aim was to uncover The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern 
Physical Science (1924), to quote the title of a book by Edwin Burtt that shaped the 
intellectual trajectory of the postwar generation. This approach, developed by writers ranging 
from Alexandre Koyré and Emile Meyerson to Arthur Lovejoy and Alfred North Whitehead, 
involved analysing the concepts expressed by leading thinkers. The key participants were 
seen to be the handful of white male authors who wrote systematic treatises and dominated 
public discussion. The history of ideas first inspired Young while an undergraduate at Yale, 
and it motivated his entire intellectual career.  
Soon after taking up a post in Cambridge as temporary Assistant Lecturer in History 
of Biology in 1964, Young began teaching a six-lecture course on ‘Science and public debate 
in Britain, 1830-1870’ to small groups of final year natural science students and others, as 
part of a Special Paper under the auspices of the History Faculty.13 His approach crystallized 
as he worked on a (never-completed) study of the Victorian evolutionary debates, which 
allowed him to combine his formal role as a historian of the life sciences with his established 
interest in psychology and the human sciences. The most significant of his contributions, 
‘Malthus and the evolutionists’, was delivered to the prestigious Stubbs Society in Oxford on 
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2 February 1968, two days after the Viet Cong launched the Tet offensive, a turning point in 
the war.  
The paper’s overarching claim was that biology and society belonged to the same 
debate. This meant drawing a wide net around the texts to be studied, with attention given to 
utopian writings by William Godwin and the Marquis de Condorcet; the natural theology of 
William Paley and the authors of the Bridgewater Treatises; the political economy of Thomas 
Chalmers and Thomas Malthus; and the social philosophy of George Combe and Herbert 
Spencer. Young then showed that the theory of evolution proposed in Darwin’s On the 
Origin of Species and in the writings of Alfred Russel Wallace was directly in dialogue with 
these authors.  
The most provocative aspect of Young’s argument was that reading Malthus was 
constitutive for Darwin’s formulation of natural selection, the keystone of modern biology. 
Especially for biologists, grounding Darwin’s discovery in a controversial work of political 
economy was an outrage. The Malthusian law famously stated that human population growth, 
unchecked, increases geometrically, while the supply of food can at most increase 
arithmetically. The result is dearth, death and a struggle for scarce resources. In Young’s 
interpretation, Darwin removed any possibility of ‘moral restraint’ (delaying marriage) in 
softening the impact of Malthus’s doctrine. He then extended it from humans to the whole 
living world, and used it to explain how new adaptations (and ultimately new species) came 
into being. In making his case, Young assembled a barrage of quotations in which Darwin 
expressed his debt to Malthus, starting with the autobiography, moving backwards in time 
through the Origin and other published works, and ending with passages from manuscript 
notebooks that had only recently been transcribed and published.14 
The claim about natural selection was the pivotal move in uniting social and 
biological thought in a shared context. Young pointed out that writers on the left had 
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traditionally prized apart Darwin and Malthus. In this tradition, Darwin was a hero of 
scientific socialism: as Marx had written to the German socialist Ferdinand Lasalle, the 
Origin ‘provides a basis in natural science for the historical class struggle.’15 In contrast, 
Malthus was condemned as a ‘bourgeois fraud’ who had naturalized the faults of a political 
system based on capitalism. Young profoundly disagreed with this separation.16 As he 
summed up his argument: 
Instead of seeing Malthus as an influence outside of biology, I should like to indicate the 
ways in which his theory and its assumptions about nature were at once pervasive in the 
biological literature of the first decades of the century and a part of an ongoing debate 
within natural theology which was at least as important to Darwin and Wallace as the 
question of the mechanism of evolution. Finally, I want to suggest that the distinction 
between social and biological issues—which was, in turn, based on the distinction 
between man and animals which evolutionary theory was supposed to break down from 
1859 onwards—was broken down in principle well before the turn of the century.17 
The essay concluded by carrying the story to the present day. As Young noted with 
uncharacteristic indirectness, ‘it is not unlikely that a future historian will find that the neat 
division between biological and social science which most current scientists believe to have 
been established, is less absolute than it now appears.’18 The key issue was purity. Western 
scientists characteristically complimented themselves on separating biology from politics and 
social science, in contrast with the situation in totalitarian regimes such as the Soviet Union, 
where scientific theories developed in line with ideological orthodoxy. The standard example 
of the dangers of mixing science with politics involved the Soviet regime’s support for the 
melioristic theories of inheritance advocated by Trofim Denisovich Lysenko. Young, 
however, believed that such cases were aberrations. This was not because science was 
otherwise always pure, but because the ‘Lysenko affair’ involved grotesque attempts by the 
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state to enforce scientific orthodoxy. Imprisonment, torture and murder were not the only 
means through which politics could shape science. Young argued that the Soviet case could 
not be used to claim that ‘well-attested scientific findings’ such as the structure of DNA were 
beyond ideology.19 
Within biology, Darwin was a critical figure during the 1960s, often treated as though 
he was a contemporary. These years were the high point of Francis Crick’s ‘central dogma’ 
and the neo-Darwinian synthesis, which ruled out any form of somatic inheritance and 
stressed the comprehensive power of natural selection over all other evolutionary 
mechanisms. The emergence of a belief in the biological determinants of human behaviour 
gave a ‘hard’ interpretation of Darwin’s theory a unique significance.20 This was also the 
decade following the centenary of the Origin in 1959, which revived Darwin’s reputation and 
sparked the enduring fascination in his life and writings. As the historian of science David 
Kohn later noted, ‘only after biologists legitimated Darwin did historians rush to study 
him’.21 Young, of course, was not out to legitimate Darwin—far from it—but rather to use 
the remarkable prominence of the theory of natural selection to tackle current issues in the 
relations of biology and society, what Theodore Roszak would term ‘the grizzly callousness 
of social Darwinism’.22 Understanding the genesis of natural selection thus held a key to 
understanding science in society. 
Malthus was the perfect battering ram. The argument that unchecked population 
growth would ultimately outstrip food supply had been a flashpoint for controversy since its 
inception, but never more so than in the period in which Young’s article appeared.23 The 
postwar years through the mid-1970s have been identified as the ‘Malthusian Moment’, with 
a resurgence of interest in the problems his work had posed. In the United States, concerns 
about global overpopulation catalysed mass environmental movements.24 In Britain, 
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however, this ‘green Malthus’ had scarcely emerged, with debate centred instead on 
questions of religion, birth control and economic analysis.25  
The prominence of the Essay in these polemics gave Malthus a fresh notoriety. His 
work was central to the distinguished Oxford geneticist Cyril Darlington’s The Evolution of 
Man and Society (1969), which appeared soon after Young’s Past and Present essay. In this 
widely discussed book (which Young furiously condemned in the New Statesman) Darlington 
reduced human history to biology, with selection between races and classes as the driving 
force of evolutionary progress. He ranked Malthus ranked high in his ‘succession of 
pioneers’, although this was strictly for the mathematical law of population, which had to be 
disentangled from the theological and social views of an Anglican parson. The discovery of 
natural selection (‘Darwin’s rider’ to the Malthusian law) had revealed competition for 
limited resources as the underlying principle of biology. 26 Malthus, in Darlington’s view, 
thus provided the foundations for a racist history of humanity. 
Most evolutionary biologists, challenged by the ascendency of molecular biology, 
were determined to demonstrate the purity of their science, so the influence of Malthus on 
Darwin was downplayed just as it had been among the Marxists. The centennial celebrations 
of the Origin in the late 1950s made the wealthy embryologist Sir Gavin de Beer the most 
influential commentator on Darwin in the English-speaking world. De Beer, who drove daily 
in his Rolls Royce to the British Museum (Natural History) even after he had ceased to be its 
director, consistently maintained that Darwin was untainted by Malthusian political economy 
or natural theology. The great naturalist’s accomplishment—achieved in splendid isolation 
and purely on the basis of observation—was to move evolutionary theorizing into the realm 




De Beer’s self-confessed status as a ‘high-priest of Darwin’ was crowned in 1960 
with publication in the Bulletin of the British Museum (Natural History): Historical Series of 
the transmutation notebooks, the records of Darwin’s thoughts on species in the crucial years 
after the Beagle voyage. Frustratingly, this edition was incomplete, as Darwin had excised 
pages for later use, and among those missing appeared to be the record of his first reading of 
Malthus’s Essay. In October 1962, de Beer was present when a black metal box of Darwin’s 
papers, previously in possession of the family, was hammered open. As was his usual 
practice, de Beer delegated the reading, sorting and transcribing of these extraordinarily 
complex materials to an Austrian-born secretary at British Museum (Natural History), Maria 
Skramovsky. As de Beer acknowledged, it was Skramovsky who ‘found, recognized and 
showed me’ the page from 28 September 1838 recording Darwin’s initial reaction to 
Malthus’s Essay.28 The page she found was first quoted by de Beer in his 1963 biography of 
Darwin, and soon afterwards was the centrepiece of an article by him in New Scientist, 
outlining ‘How Darwin came by his theory of natural selection.’  
With triple underlining and extensive interlineation, the notebook page was clearly 
significant, and Young’s article would quote it as ‘unequivocal evidence of Malthus’s rôle in 
the actual formation of Darwin’s theory’.29 We do not know what Skramovsky thought about 
her discovery, but for de Beer and other biologists, the explanation remained unchanged. 
Malthus had no constitutive part in the origins of natural selection; the Essay provided 
nothing more than an enhanced appreciation of the mathematics of selection pressure—as 
well as an unproven ‘banal slogan’ about geometrical versus arithmetical rates of increase.30 
To the end of his life de Beer continued to resist any significant role for Malthus, and he 
vetoed publication of Darwin’s notebooks on metaphysics and mind, seeing these as outside 
proper scientific interests. Skramovsky had wanted her transcriptions to appear as a follow-up 
to the notebooks on species, but was overruled.31  
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As in the natural sciences, Darwin was recognized in the humanities as a significant 
figure, although the analysis of his work typically fell into the chasm separating what the 
novelist C. P. Snow had identified in 1959 as ‘the two cultures’. During the years 
immediately after 1959, no professionally-trained historians of science in Britain were 
seriously studying Darwin or the development of evolutionary theory.32 In Cambridge, the 
history and philosophy of science, as part of the Natural Sciences Tripos, stressed rigorous 
analysis of concepts in the physical sciences and in philosophy, and technical work on the 
history of astronomy. The subject was not yet conducted in a distinct department, but through 
a ‘committee’ with members scattered across the university. Young was initially placed in the 
Department of Experimental Psychology, but he looked to the History Faculty, then 
dominated by historians of politics and religion, for intellectual orientations. The history of 
political thought as developed by Quentin Skinner, John Dunn and others—although seen by 
Young as a crucial resource—in retrospect can be seen to have almost completely ignored the 
natural sciences.33 
There were, however, places in Cambridge where the research Young was advocating 
could be pursued, such as a path-breaking seminar series in 1968-69 at the King’s Research 
Centre. This monthly seminar, which brought together many future leaders of the field and a 
remarkable array of approaches, was co-organized with Piyo Rattansi, who had moved from 
Leeds to Cambridge on a four-year fellowship at King’s which had been brokered by Young. 
Soon after his appointment as assistant lecturer, Young had learned about Rattansi’s work on 
seventeenth-century English scientific debates from a key mentor, the sinologist Joseph 
Needham, who was based in Gonville and Caius College.34 Young also maintained good 
relations with the History Faculty, and opposed combining history of science with philosophy 
of science in a separate department, as occurred in 1972.35 He was friendly with Raymond 
Williams in English, and Martin Richards in Social and Political Sciences. But most of these 
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connections proved fragile, as when he and John Dunn fell out over Marxism. As another 
one-time associate Martin Bernal recalled, Young ‘achieved a great deal but has antagonized 
almost everybody he encountered.’36 The person with the closest intellectual interests would 
have been John Burrow, whose doctoral thesis provided the basis for the still standard 
Evolution and Society: A Study in Victorian Social Theory (1966), which Young praised in 
the Cambridge Review and assigned to students.37 Burrow, however, had earlier failed to 
obtain a position in the Faculty, leaving Young as the only person in Cambridge pursuing the 
intellectual history of the modern period. 
The situation was more promising for seventeenth-century studies and elsewhere in 
the country, largely through approaches pioneered by Rattansi, J.E. McGuire and Charles 
Webster at Leeds and the Marxist seventeenth-century historian Christopher Hill and others 
at Oxford. History was changing rapidly, with a stress on hitherto marginalized groups and 
the critical revaluation of traditional narratives. Notably, it was at Oxford, not Cambridge, 
that ‘Malthus and the evolutionists’ had its main public airing in 1968 at the Stubbs Society. 
Young’s name had been put forward by the historian of science Alistair Crombie, who 
quickly regretted his suggestion. Oxford was also the home of Past and Present, and the 
assistant editor Timothy Mason, a Marxist historian of Nazi Germany, invited Young to 
submit to the journal after attending the seminar.38 Among historical periodicals, Past and 
Present was unusual in being run by a collective board, combining Marxists such as Hill and 
Mason and liberals such as Lawrence Stone.39 Rapidly emerging as the most prestigious 
journal of its kind in the English-speaking world, it was not only publishing material from the 
left, but also occasional pieces on the history of science, although the latter had exclusively 
dealt with seventeenth-century topics.  
‘Malthus and the evolutionists’—together with the thesis-book on Mind, Brain and 
Adaptation in the Nineteenth Century (1970), and the other essays on ‘man’s place in nature’ 
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from this time—established Young’s reputation within the academy. This was just at the 
moment, however, when he became increasingly frustrated by the limitations of a university 
career. Young had failed to gain a permanent university lectureship when one was advertised 
in 1967, despite his evident promise at this early stage.40 Although in 1971 he was appointed 
to a term-limited post as director of a Wellcome-funded Unit for the History of Medicine in 
what soon became the Department of History and Philosophy of Science, this proved a source 
of conflict and administrative logjams. By this point Young had already begun the work that 
led to the founding of the Radical Science Journal and the British Society for Social 
Responsibility in Science. In 1974 he made a brave decision to pursue these new initiatives, 
move to London and abandon the security of university and college positions.41 Young 
subsequently produced science programmes for Channel 4, began several important journals, 
founded two publishing companies, and eventually studied to become a practicing 




If Young ‘moved on’, to use one of his favourite phrases, his central argument about Darwin 
and Malthus remained available in the pages of Past and Present, where it was widely cited 
and read. The essay was reprinted for students in a series produced by the American publisher 
Bobbs-Merrill, which indicates just how extensively it was used in teaching. In 1985 it was 
republished in Darwin’s Metaphor: Nature’s Place in Victorian Culture, which collected 
Young’s articles from 1969 to 1973.42 Three settings were crucial for the reception of 
Young’s argument: historical studies of Charles Darwin, the social history of nineteenth-




‘Malthus and the evolutionists’ appeared at an early but pivotal period in the scholarly 
re-evaluation of significant figures such as Newton, Galileo, Freud and Darwin. This 
movement was delayed in the history of political economy: the increased public prominence 
of Malthus had been accompanied by editions of his writings and occasional articles, but the 
only book-length account of the debate remained Kenneth Smith’s largely descriptive and 
anti-Malthusian The Malthusian Controversy of 1951.43 In contrast, the 1959 centennial of 
the Origin had sparked an explosion of celebratory publications about Darwin. Even so, 
serious research into primary sources had barely begun. Indications of the riches of the 
manuscript collections, deposited mainly in the University Library in Cambridge, were 
available in publications by Darwin’s granddaughter, Nora Barlow, of the autobiography and 
various documents from the Beagle voyage; and in the piecemeal appearance of the 
transmutation notebooks between 1959 and 1967. Access to the collection was mediated by 
the embryologist Sydney Smith and the archivist Peter Gautrey. A succession of scholars, 
largely from North America, began to make the pilgrimage to the Fens that marked one as a 
true expert.44 
 The examination of this rich archive by professionally trained historians was 
transformative. No longer was it easy to say, as de Beer had done (and continued to 
maintain), that Darwin already had the theory of natural selection before reading Malthus in 
September 1838. Nor did it make sense to claim, as passages in the autobiography and in 
letters can be interpreted—that Darwin had seen artificial selection in action but needed to 
understand how to apply it to nature. Instead, the reading of Malthus’s Essay led Darwin to 
realize the power, not just of competition between species, but of competition between 
individuals of the same species. This argument, made by Sandra Herbert in her Brandeis 
Ph.D. dissertation of 1968 and a brief article in 1971, had the potential to give Young’s 
broader claims vital specificity and content.45 
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The other key revelation, developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s especially by 
David Kohn, was that Darwin had ‘a theory to work by’ based on reproduction, well before 
the reading of Malthus. Darwin was searching the literature on breeding, not to find an 
analogue in nature for artificial selection, but to answer questions about generation, growth 
and heredity. On reading the Essay, Darwin initially expressed the force of intraspecies 
competition through a violently mechanical metaphor of wedging; only in the following 
months did he reconceptualize his new vision in terms of softer analogies between ‘artificial’ 
and ‘natural’ selection.46 
‘Malthus and the evolutionists’ came out remarkably well from these studies. As 
Kohn wrote in a phrase that Young liked to quote, ‘The work of one recent commentator, 
Robert M. Young, stands out as nearly definitive.’47 Yet in significant respects Young never 
appreciated the potential of what authors such as Kohn and Herbert had done for the 
historiographic politics of the Malthus question. While quoting the relevant passages and 
stressing the relevant contexts, Young had been surprisingly vague on the critical issue of 
what Darwin took away from the Essay: ‘It seems that Malthus legitimized the idea of a law 
of struggle, impressed Darwin with the intensity of struggle, and provided a convenient 
natural mechanism for the changes which Darwin was studying in the selection of 
domesticated varieties’.48 From this perspective, Malthus gave new emphasis to the concept 
of struggle, already familiar from other works; but this was a change of degree rather than of 
kind. And Young also expressed the traditional view that before Malthus Darwin had no 
theory, but instead was searching for a natural analogy with artificial selection. 
In other words, at this level of detail ‘Malthus and the evolutionists’ simply repeated 
the standard line familiar from de Beer’s Darwin biography. Young admitted as much in the 
mid-1980s, noting that ‘my own reading of what Darwin “got” from the Essay is remarkably 
close’ to what de Beer and other biologists had said. What mattered to Young was the 
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broader context.49 However, the existence in the notebooks of a pre-Malthusian theory for 
speciation, and the distinction between ‘interspecific’ and ‘intraspecific’ competition were 
not just details, but ways of placing individual competition and capitalist political economy at 
the heart of the theory. Although de Beer, Mayr and other biologists continued as sceptics, 
the broader significance of Malthus was suddenly harder to dismiss, which made Young’s 
argument much more directly significant. 50 
 For all that, the turn to manuscripts had major downsides. The work in what was 
becoming known as the ‘Darwin Industry’ became increasingly esoteric, inward-looking and 
out of touch with more general trends in science studies in being resolutely focused on a 
single individual. As Young reflected after attending a major meeting organised by Kohn at 
the Villa di Mondeggi in Florence in 1982: 
The zeal with which current scientist-historians seek to separate Darwin’s genius and 
achievements from the work, ideas, and influences of Spencer, Chambers, and 
Wallace seems to betray a pathetic, sycophantic hagiography—Great Man history—
which I thought was waning in the history of science, as historians of science thought 
of their discipline in terms of the history of ideas, the history of culture, and the 
history of society. Indeed, one distinguished biologist-historian [Ernst Mayr] 
concluded his comments by saying that Darwin was the author of ‘the greatest and 
most universal revolution ever experienced in the history of human thought’. I found 
myself asking, why do we defer to great men? Why do we defer to working scientists 
who are part-time historians? Why do we defer to great men in the history of science? 
Why do we not consider the social processes of scientific change in their broadest 
contexts? Where have these questions gone in the past decade?51 
Although close studies of the manuscripts often ended up supporting the connection 
between Malthus and Darwin, specialist monographs and long articles in the Journal of the 
20 
 
History of Biology and the annual Studies in History of Biology seemed to have lost interest in 
the metaphysical foundations of a debate about humans in nature that extended to the present 
day. Historians of biology, in their attempts to establish rigour and appease practicing 
scientists, had too often overlooked the political context in which their work was embedded. 
Young would not have been surprised to know that Mayr, an honoured presence at the 
Florence meeting, privately supported Darlington’s view that human history was the product 
of biological competition between lesser and more advanced biological races. As Mayr had 
written in a letter to Darlington, ‘I am delighted you have said all these things which are so 
true but which are simply suppressed in the “egalitarian” mass media. . . .I am frank to say, 
your bias, or I should say government policies based on your bias, should promise a far better 
future for mankind than the ruling bias.’52 
Young collected his old essays directly in response to the Florence gathering. By his 
own admission he had left the history of science well behind, and ironically, his academic 
reputation as a historian became retrospectively limited to that of a leading ‘Darwin 
scholar’.53 His jaundiced view was coloured by the fact that the Darwin/Malthus literature 
was almost the only subject in nineteenth-century science he tracked closely. He was 
disappointed by its increasing narrowness and lack of political bite. Although vastly more 
was known about Darwin, the literature seemed—sometimes unwittingly, sometimes not—
simply to reinforce notions of genius and singular greatness. 
There was, of course, a lot else going on. Although there were only limited 
indications of this in Florence, the institutional and social history of British science was 
blossoming. This work was produced by a diverse array of participants spread across the 
English-speaking world, especially in the north of England, as part of a much broader move 
to cultural history among historians generally.54 The resulting studies vastly increased the 
range of participants in British science, and offered for the first time a secure institutional 
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framework for understanding their activities and status.55 The dominance of a few leading 
men was no longer a taken-for-granted feature of intellectual life in the nineteenth century, 
but understood as a product of the individualistic bias of British scientific culture. 
A later generation carried this project further, dismantling monolithic conceptions of 
‘popular science’ and revealing new spaces for science populated by women, artisans and 
other hitherto marginalized groups. After these writings, no one could say, as Young had, that 
popular phrenology and mechanics’ institutes could be demarcated from the study of an 
‘intelligentsia’.56 (He had never even considered the idea of women, other than George Eliot, 
playing any significant role.) His insistence that the agenda should be ‘broadened’ to include 
figures such as Herbert Spencer and Robert Chambers looked out of touch, even in the very 
specific context of research into Darwin.57 
As John Christie said in reviewing Darwin’s Metaphor in 1988, there was no 
particular reason why ‘heavy-duty social history’ could not be combined with a ‘broad-based 
intellectualist historiography’.58 Young did know about the transformation of the social 
history of Victorian science, but from his perspective it was bound always to be peripheral; 
with characteristic candour, he admitted to not having read Jack Morrell and Arnold 
Thackray’s Gentlemen of Science: The Early Years of the British Association (1981), 
probably the most significant work in this tradition.59 He had always made it clear that what 
mattered were the writings of ‘the intelligentsia’, not what he explicitly dismissed as ‘the 
social history of ideas conceived as the study of low-brow popular opinion’.60 In fact, 
Young’s phrenologically-limited focus was always even more specific, on some twenty 
‘major thinkers’ and ‘major’ reviews of their works. His essays referred extensively to the 
periodical press, but never discussed, say, something so fundamental as the political 
orientation of the Edinburgh Review compared with the Quarterly. Young’s polemical 
farewell to his Cambridge years, published in 1973, pointed towards the need for what he 
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called a ‘social intellectual history’.61 This, however, remained an aspiration, in important 
respects not easy to reconcile with his overall political project. 
Within the history of science generally in the 1970s and 1980s, even more important 
than the retooling of the social history of science was a move from the history of ideas to the 
history of practice. This was a political change of tactics, as analysis moved from science as 
ideology to science as work.62 The inspiring sociological studies were about life in 
laboratories, showing how the contents of science could be the subject of sociological 
analysis.63 From Young’s perspective as with many on the left who emerged from the debates 
in the 1960s, the new sociology of knowledge only rarely put to the fore questions of overt 
political use and ideology. Partly for that reason, this work never seemed particularly 
important to Young, even as his own concerns moved towards studies of the labour process.64 
He never applied these approaches to the Victorian debates, nor did he appreciate work that 
did this. 
Yet the new methods did have a political foundation. It had simply proved too easy to 
see the ‘social’ as an optional add-on.65 Thus Malthus could be seen as critically important to 
the making of Darwin’s evolutionary theory, but could arguably not carry the ideological 
baggage of political economy and its draconian applications in the 1830s, let alone provide an 
argument for radical action today. Such connections could scarcely bear the weight of 
Young’s increasingly frustrated and repetitive glosses on his early work. As Frank Turner 
complained in reviewing Darwin’s Metaphor, ‘that commentary really has little or nothing to 
do with what Young has written or taught us.’66 
Even more critically, too much of Darwin’s science seemed hard to fit into an 
ideological template. What about writings on barnacles, orchids and coral reefs, the research 
that gave Darwin’s evolutionary theory its authority and power? This is a point that Thomas 
Kuhn had raised in discussing the problem soon after the Past and Present essay appeared, 
23 
 
and one that Jonathan Hodge pressed at the Florence meeting. Young always resisted the idea 
of a ‘scale’ of purity moving from science to ideology, and repeatedly castigated Edward 
Thompson and others for separating the polemicist Thomas Henry Huxley from the 
supposedly neutral scientist Darwin.67 However, Young’s own unwillingness to look closely 
at scientific work in the laboratory and field tended towards precisely that conclusion. He did 
not read any papers in zoological, botanical and natural history journals, so these arenas 
seemed outside the discussion. Thus in dealing with geology, Young was willing to adopt 
Martin Rudwick’s view that stratigraphy, surveying and other subjects could be studied 
within the parameters of a well-demarcated disciplinary community, insulated from 
considerations of economic management or imperial control.68 Only when the documents 
revealed specifically religious, political or otherwise ‘ideological’ concerns did Young show 
any interest. As Kuhn commented on the paper, ‘far from being a barrier breaker, it belongs 
to a standard historiographical tradition which has done much to preserve the very separation 
Young deplores.’69 
For many historians of science writing in light of the sociological work 
unintentionally inspired by Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), the key 
political imperative was to tackle the detailed contents of science. There were important 
moves towards this during the mid-1970s, as in studies of laboratory research schools by Jack 
Morrell and Gerald Geison, and early interest in the sociological work of Harry Collins, 
particularly his 1975 article on the replication of experiments in gravity waves, ‘The seven 
sexes’.70 The key developments in bringing scientific practice and social history together for 
the nineteenth century date from Steven Shapin’s classic paper in the Sociological Review of 
1979 on phrenology, tellingly titled ‘The politics of observation’. Shapin’s previous essays in 
this area had mapped support for phrenology onto ideology and social class, using models of 
interest theory combined with work in prosopography. The new work looked at practices of 
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observation and dissection. By 1982 Shapin had brought together a host of studies together 
under this umbrella in an influential paper, ‘History of science and its sociological 
reconstructions’.71 
The same impulse was evident in work close to Young’s areas of original concern. 
Adrian Desmond’s Archetypes and Ancestors: Palaeontology in Victorian London (1982) and 
The Politics of Evolution: Morphology, Medicine, and Reform in Radical London (1989) 
combined fiercely fine-grained studies of scientific and medical periodicals with an 
understanding of political positions, to reveal the ideological underpinnings of disputes about 
animal bodies and structures. Instead of a ‘common context’ of debate among ‘the 
intelligentsia’, Desmond revealed a society riven by controversies.72 Similar work in a variety 
of fields was carried out at the same time: Crosbie Smith and Norton Wise on 
thermodynamics and electromagnetism; Evelleen Richards on evolution and development; 
Simon Schaffer on astronomy.73 These outlined precisely the kind of mediations that Young 
had called for, but for which his methods were not particularly well suited. It would have 
been hard to imagine Young reading papers about the fossil remains of mammals, the 
dissection of the frontal cortex, or the reproductive organs of the platypus, but that was where 
the politics of science was most profoundly expressed. 
More generally, Young remained deeply dissatisfied with the direction of academic 
life in Britain and America. Darwin studies had turned largely inward; from his perspective 
the new social history of science didn’t tackle the big issue of ‘man’s place in nature’—a 
topic that, despite praise for a few studies by former students, he saw as dominated by 
theologically inspired waffle about ‘science and religion’ from lapsed evangelicals.74 And for 
all the references to politics, much of the historical work inspired by sociology of knowledge 
was narrowly targeted at professional audiences, so that its potential significance was 
obscured.75 As has become clear in the intervening years, the pioneering work by sociologists 
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provided superb resources for dealing with issues inside laboratories, but was less effective in 
connecting to wider concerns. In retrospect this ‘new internalism’, evident in some but by no 
means all of the work, can be seen to reflect a caution induced by the hostile climate faced by 
academics in the years after 1980. Much of the sociological literature became mired in 
discussions of epistemology, leading to the fruitless conflicts of the science wars during the 
late nineties. The moment in which an author could hope for a heavily researched academic 
paper in Past and Present to connect with direct political action had passed. 
Conversely, when Adrian Desmond and Jim Moore offered a ‘defiantly political’ 
portrait of Darwin in their best-selling biography of 1991, Young slammed it in a long review 
for being too smooth and accessible.76 An argument intended to provoke outrage had 
transmuted into new orthodoxy, a racy narrative that could be advertised to commuters on the 
London Underground. From Young’s perspective, rough authenticity had been sacrificed for 
commercial surface, as had happened in the 1960s as rock music compromised with corporate 
capitalism—blunting the edge of revolution through repressive sublimation. To quote again 
from his essay on ‘The new nation?’ in 1970: ‘How much has the music really freed people 
from oppression and repression, and how much is it a subtle accommodation with them?’ 77 
It was all too easy. To Young’s dismay there was no sense of historiographical debate 
in the Darwin biography, of what was at stake in the link with Malthus. Young saw more 
hope for the field through the work of Donna Haraway, which was both deeply engaged and 
rough around the edges (but accessible only to a tiny fraction of the audience). Whether his 
response to the biography was justified, the review expressed perfectly why Young had 








I met Bob Young on six occasions, the last time in May 2016 at the memorial conference for 
the much-missed historian of the human sciences, John Forrester. So unlike the others who 
spoke at a workshop in Cambridge held in Bob’s honour following his death in 2019, I never 
knew him well. For me as for many who entered history of science in the 1970s, Robert M. 
Young was without question a figure to be reckoned with, but almost entirely through his 
writings. The first serious book in history of science I owned was his 1973 festschrift for the 
sinologist Joseph Needham, Changing Perspectives in the History of Science, coedited with 
Mikuláš Teich. I bought this volume in London a couple of years after it came out, and was 
nearly arrested at Foyles bookshop by a security guard mid-way on an escalator having failed 
to understand the bizarre system of paying for books which operated there at the time. 
Young’s long essay, ‘The historiographic and ideological contexts of the nineteenth-century 
debate on man’s place in nature’, was like nothing I had ever read. Not only did it introduce 
me to what he later termed ‘the corruption, opportunism, and hypocrisy of certain colleagues 
and patrons’ in Cambridge,78 it also opened my eyes to the breath and significance of the 
subject. 
Although I did not know Young at all well, in an important respect I have a unique 
relationship with him. Ever since arriving in the Department of History and Philosophy of 
Science in Cambridge in 1992 I have taught courses that are direct descendants of his lectures 
on ‘Science and public debate’. For decades I have been hammering home lessons about 
Malthus, Darwin, natural theology, the 1834 New Poor Law and similar issues to 
undergraduates in the Natural Sciences Tripos. Every spring I read out the relevant passages 
from Darwin’s notebooks and stress that natural selection was not articulated in isolation in 
the Galapagos, but on Great Marlborough Street in London, in the midst of a passionate 
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debate about the place of humans in nature. And yet I always suspected that Young thought I 
was too ‘soft’, willing to work within a system that he condemned as too corrupt and 
constraining for the intellectual ventures he wished to undertake.  
For what it is worth, my view is that Young never fully appreciated the leverage for 
change that institutions can bring. Particularly after the advent of Thatcher and Reagan, with 
the decimation of the labour movement and the systematic destruction of many of the 
structures on which earlier campaigns had depended, the universities offered one of the few 
remaining platforms for the expression of alternative views. That is one of the reasons for 
Young’s own partial return to academic life, first through a visiting professorship at Kent 
(1991-1994) and then as professor of psychoanalytic studies at Sheffield (1995-2000). These 
appointments acknowledged what was by then a substantial body of work in psychology and 
the human sciences, and his status as a practicing psychiatrist. And it is also true, of course, 
that even places like Cambridge, which remain deeply traditional, have changed during the 
past half century, most clearly in attitudes towards diversity. Like Young himself, they have 
‘moved on’.  
For all their grounding in the distant days of the 1960s, Young’s writings continue to 
serve as a disciplinary conscience. The dichotomies he argued against—between science and 
society, nature and culture, mind and body, internal and external—are still as pervasive as 
ever, and the forces supporting them have become even more powerful. At the same time, his 
call to overcome these divisions, and for using the power of history to contribute to breaking 
them down, are urgent in new ways and for different reasons. Today we see both Malthus and 
Darwin in wider contexts involving race, gender, immigration and cross-cultural exchange.79 
The debate about the place of humans in nature is not only a question of belief among the 
leaders of thought, but of survival. I can thus end with one of Young’s favourite quotations 
from George Eliot: as Dorothea Brooke’s uncle says in Middlemarch, ‘”I went into science a 
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